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• 49TH CoNGREss, } HOUSE OF REPRESENTAT[VES.
1st Session.

REPORT
{ Nu. 193.

FORFE[T LANDS GRANTED ATLANTIU AND PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY.

FEBHUARY

3, 18tl6.-Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed.

Mr. Conn, from the Committee on the Public Lands, submitted the follnwing

R.EPORT:
[To accompany bill H. R.. 453.]

The Committee on the Public Lands, to whom was referred the bill (H. R.
453) to forfeit the lands granted to the Atlantic and Pao~tic Railroad
Company to aid in the constnwtion of a railroad and telegraph line from
the States of Missouri and Arkansas to the Pacific coast, and restore the
same to settlement, and for other purposes, have had the same under consideration, and nwke the following report :
Strike out the words "and landR for stations," in lines 3 and 4 of the
bill; also strike out all after the word "be," in line 21, section 1, and
insert in lieu thereof " $1.25 per acre," and add the following: "Provided, That nothing in this act shall be held to impair any right that
the United States may have in or to the lands not forfeited by this act;"
also strike out all of section 2.
And, as thus amended, your committee recommend the passage of
the bill, and assign the following reasons therefor:
The grant made to the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company is,
according to the estimate made by the company, the largest land grant
ever made to any corporation in this country, the estimated number of
acres being 49,244,803-an empire in extent.
The act making thts great grant was approved July 27, 1866. (14
Stat. at Large, 292.) By this aet the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad
Company was authorized and empowered to lay out and construct a
continuous railroad and telegraph line, beginning at the town of Springfield, in the State of Missouri ; thence to the western boundary line of
said State, and thence, by the most eligible railroad route as should be
determined by said company, to a point on the Canadian River; thence
to the town of Albuquerque, on the riYer Del Norte, and thence, by way
of the Agua Frio, to the head waters of the Colorado Ohiq nita; thence,
along the thirty-fifth parallel, to the Colorado River, and thence to the
Pacific Ocean, with a branch uivergiug at a point where the main line
strikes the Canadian River, runuing eastwardly to a point on the western boundary line of the State of Arkansas, at the town of Van Buren;
thus the main line passing through the Indian Territor,v, Texas, New
Mexico, Arizona, and California, a distance of more than 2,000 miles.
The second section of said act grants to said company the right of
way· ovee the public lands to the extent of 100 feet on each side of said
road, and au additional amount of land for depots, &c.
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The third section provides "that there be 1ud lwreby is granted" to
said company, for the purpose of aiding in the construction of its road
and' telegraph line, every alternate section of public land, not mineral,
designated by odd numbers, to the amount of twent,y alternate sections
per mile 011 each side of said railroad line through the Territories of the
D nited States, and ten alternate sections per mile on each side of said
railroad whenever it passes through any State. And in case any lauds
within this limit were disposed of by the Governmeut, the company
was to have the rig·ht to select other lands
lieu thereof iu alternate
odd-num be.red sections, not more than 10 miles be.)oll(l the limits of said
alternate sections, and not including the reserved uumbers.
The fourth section of said act provides that whenever said company
shall have. 25 consecutive miles of any portion of said railroad and telegraph line ready for the service contemplated, the President of the
United States :-.hall appoint three commissioner::;; to examine the same,
and if it shall appear that the same has been completed in a good, substantial, and workmanlike manner the commissioners shall so report,
under oath, to the President of the United States, and patents of lands
shall be issued to said railroad company confirming to said company
the right and title to s~id lands situate opposite to and coterminous
with said completed section of said road. And the same shall be done
as often as any 25 consecutive miles are completed.
The sixth section provides that the President of the United States
shall cause tho lands to be surveyed for 40 miles in width on both sides
of the entire line of said road, after the general route shall lw fixed, and
as fast as may be required by the construction of said railroad; and
that the odd sections of land granted shall not be liable to sale or entry
or pre-emption before or after they are surveyed, except by said company,
as provided by said act.
The eighth and ninth sections set forth the principal conditions on
which said grant is made.
The twelfth section provides that the company shall accept the terms
and conditions of the grant within two years after the passage of the
act by depositing in the office of the Secretary of the Interior such acceptance in writing under the corporate seal of said company, duly
executed pursuant to the direction of its board of directors first had
and obtained.
These are the only sections of the act which need be referred to at
this time for the purposes of this report. Uongress passed an act April
20, 1870, to enable the company to mortgage its road, which will be
considered further on. ·
The material facts are as follows:
The company accepted the grant by depositing in the Interior Department its acceptance in writing on the 27th day of November, 1866.
By the sixth section of said act, as bas already been observed, it is
provided that the company shall fix the general route of its road, and
when this was done the President of the United States was to cause
the iands to be withdrawn, &c.
A map of the general route of said road was filed in the Interior Department Decem her 17, 1866, from SpTingfield, in the State of Missouri,
to the west line of said State, and the public lands embraced within the
limits of said grant were withdrawn to the ext~Itt or coterminous with
this part of the located route.
It is a fact that should be observed, that no furtller map of the general
route was filed until December 2, 1871, more than five years aft.e·r the
passage of the granting act. And the first map of definite location was
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not filed in the Interior Department until December 10, 1870, and that
extended only from Springfield to N eoslw, in the State of MisRouri, and
was filed more than four years after the date of the granting act, and
more than two years after the construction of said road was to havebeen commenced, and after two years of the time had elapsed during
which it was required by the gTanting act to comvlete not less than 5()
miles of its road each year. It is claimed by the company that the
construction of the road was commenced July 4, 1868. But the affidavits of the chief engineer, on•file in the Interior Department, show
that the first ~5 miles of the road was not completed until September
27, 1870, being that portion of the road running west from Springfield,
in the State of Missouri. And only 125 miles of the road was completed
within the time fixed for the completion of the whole of the main line,.
leaving unfinished more than ~,0.00 miles; thus showing that if the
construction of the road was commenced on July 4, 1868, it was only
done for the purpose of a technical .compliance with that condition, as
no substantial part of the road, as we ha\'e already shown, was completed until about September, 1870, thereby proving that the company
was guilty at the very beginning of two flagrant violations of the conditions of its contract with the GO\'•·rnment, in not eompleting at least
50 miles each two years after the date when the wol'k was to commence
and not having completed the main line within the time fixed. The 125
miles was not completed until October 14, 1871.
In November, 1870, this company purchased from the Saint Louis
and San Francisco Rail way Company the latter'~ railroad running from
a_point near Saint, Louis to Sp:ingfiel.d, in the State of Missouri. 'f his
was done u~J.Cler the pretext of securmg an eastern outlet. The price
agreed to be paid was $10,000,000, which was secured by mortgage on
the property so purchased, and that part of the grantee's road together
with the land grant lying in the State of Missouri. A year after this
purchase the company became so much embarrassed financially that it
stopped the further construction of its road and afterwards made default in the payment of interest on its said mortgage indebtedness.
And the said mortgage was foreclosed, and afterward~, on September
14, 1876, the entire mortgaged property was sold to William F. Buckley, and by him conveyed, November ~: 1876, to the Saint r.. ouis and
San ~"'rancisco Railway Company. Thus this latter company again became the owner of the property it bad sold and also tuat part of the
road and land grant belonging to the Atlantic and Pacific Uompany
lying in the State of Missouri, leaving the latter company the owner of
but 34 miles of completed road at the date of said sale. And this is the
only portion of said road the company built west of the western line of
the State of Missouri. And this is operated and controlled by the Saint
Louis and San Francisco Railway Company. This latter company built
during the last year 65 miles of road over the line of the Atlantic and
Pacific west from Vinita, and is now operating the same.
As has been stated, the Atlantic and Pacific company stopped the construction of its road in the year 1871, and no more of its road was completed until November, 1~82, more than eleven years after it had suspended work 1 and more than four years after the time when the main
line should have been completed by the terms of the-granting act. And
said company was utterly powerless to complete any further portion of
its road when the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe and the Saint Louis
and San Francisco Railroad companies, for the purpose of being able to
completely control the Atlantic and Pacific company and its imperial
land grant, and to ultimately become the owner of all its property,
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entered into a eontraet with the latter company for the completion of
that part of ~aid road from Albnquerque, N. Mex., to the Atlantic
Ocean, knowu and rlesign:-~ted as the \Vestern DiYi8ion. This tripartite
agreement was t>ntered into .January 31, 18tm, and provided. for the immeJ.iate completion of the !:'aid Western Din:--iou.
To provide tlte mOJH'Y necessary for this construction, early in 1880,
a first mortgage, to secure an issue of bonds not exceeding· $~5,000 per
mile, was placed upon the entire railroad, franchise, and land grant of
the W t>Stern Di ,·is ion; alHl an ineome mort!{age to secure an il'lsue of
income bond~, not exeet:>diug $l8, 750 per mile upon this . di 'rision, was
also executed. Should the net earnings of the Western Division prove
insufficient to meet the illterest upon those first-mortgage bonds, the
Saint Louis and San Fra11cisco Railway Uompany aud the Atchison,
Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad Compau,y haYe guaranteed the sa.me to
the extent of ~5 per cent. of their gross earnings upon all lrnsiness interchanged by th em respectively witil the said Western Division.
In .April, 1880, $10,000,000 of tLe first-mortgage bonds and $7,500,000
of tbe income bouds ot this division were sold by subscription at par
for the first-mortgage bonds to parties holding· rigllts under the agreement. A secoll(l subscription of $15,00u,ooo firsts and $11,250,000 incomes of the Western DiYision was oftered the same parties by circular
dated January 20, l 882, and promptly subscribed in full; but before
allotment all subscriptions were reduced by the board of directors February 2r5, l 882, to 40 per cent. of the original amount-that is, to
$6,000,000 firsts and $4,500,000 incomes, in accordance with the right
reserved by the term~ of tbe subscription.
·Should tile net proceeds of these subscriptions pro,Te to be insufficient
to complete tbe road, and pay the interest upon the first-mortgage bonds
during construction, arrangements have been made with the Atchison,
Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad Company aud the Saint Louis and San
Francisco Hail way Company, which owns nearly all the capital stock of
this company, to advance any defieit, share and share alike, in the form
of a loan, to be repaid hereafter.
And a first mortgage was also executed on the 1st day of March, 1882,
on that portion of the road between the west line of the State of Missouri, near Seneca, to the town of Albuquerque, on the Rio Grande River,
in the Territory of New Mexico, called the Central Division, to secure
the payment of bonds to the amount of $25,000 per mile for that part
of the road.
These bonds were all taken, and are now owned by the parties interested in the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe and the Saint Louis and
· San Francisco companies, and the capital stock is now owned by these
two companies; and tbe Atlantic and Pacific road, and all the property, rights, and franchises of the company, are virtually owned and controlled by these two corporations. 'l'hey hold the mortgage interests
complete, all of tile road which is completed, and operate it after it is so
completed. We believe that the tripartite agreement above referred to
was entered into with a full understanding by all the partieA that the
Atlantic and Pacific was to maintain a nominal existence merely so as
to enable these two corporations to secure the benefit of the land grant
to the extent they desire under the act passed by Congress April21,
1871, to enable the Atlantic and Pacific Company to mortgage its road.
They caused the mortgages named to be executed, and the bonds to be_,.
issued, for the individuals composing these two companies owned the
capital stock of the Atlantic and Pacific Company, thus giving them
complete control of the latter company. 'l'hey bought the bonds so
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i&lsued, and now own them, aJI(l these corporations guaranteed their payment. They are, thert>fore, both debtor and cre(litor in this transaction.
And they are now onl.\· completing such parts of said roa.d as suits their
selfish dPsires, in securing such parts of the land grant as may be coterminus therewith at thP date of the declaration of forfeiture by the
Government. Since entering· into this tripartite agreement they have
completed 559 mile:s of the Western Divi:sion, extending west from Isleta
Junction on the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe l{sailroad to the Uolorado l{i.ver, near the Needles. At this latter pojnt .connection is formed
with the Southern Pacific Railroad, and running arrangements have
been entered into with the latter road, extending to the city of San
Francisco.
\Vbetber the road will ever be completed west of its present terminus
we do 110t lmow. But we do know that the lands have been withdrawn
for more than fourteen years from homestead pre-emption and entry the
whole length of the road, and even beyond what was contemplated by
the grantiug act. The act required the company to construct its road
on the most practicable and eligible route along the thirty-fifth parallel
of north latitude to t.he Pacific Ocean. This fixed the western terminus
of the road, as we believe, at or near the point where the thirt,y-fifth
parallel intersects the Pacific Ocean. But instead of filing i. s map of
definite location, in accord with this, when it crossed the east line of the
Statt:> of California, it left the thirty-fifth parallel and passed up the
Pacific coast, and terminated the location near the thirty-eigl:tth parallel of north latitmle at the city of San Francisco; and strange as it may
seem to ~orne, the Assistaut Attoruey-General of the Unit~d States, W.
H. Smith, sustaiued the rig-ht of the company to do so in a written opinion delivered March 16, 1874, which was confirmed by the then Secretary of the Interior, 0. Delano. Secretary Cox, a former Secretary,
denied the comp.my this right in a written opinion to the Commissioner
of the General Land Office, delivered on November U, l869. He said:
I cannot recognize the claim of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company to a reservation of lands upon the route in question. The act alreacly cited (Jnly 27, 1866),
upon which the~· rely, cloes not, as I construe it, make them a grant of lands from the
point at which the road shall strike the Colorado River to San Francisco.

We concur in the· opinion of Secretary Cox. He is a gentleman of
high legal attainments, and was au honest and faithful officer. But his
opinion was o\erruled, as we have shown, and a vast area of public land
was added to this already magnificent grant. The amount of land withdrawn in the State of Ualifornia on account of this gr;-~nt amounts to
6,855,040 acres, embracing some of the most valuable lands in the State.
And a summary of these facts shows:
(1) That the Atlantic and Pacific Company never completed but 34
miles of the road which it now claims to own.
(2) That at the time when the main line should have been completed
(J nly 4, 1878), there was uncompleted 2,267 miles of that line.
(3) That said company at no time since its creation has been, and is
not now, able to complete the road.
(4) That the stockholders of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe and
the Saint Louis and 8an Francisco Railroad companies own most of its
capital stock.
(5) That these corporations caused the mortgages to be executed on
the franchises, rights, and pjoperty, including the land grant, and caused
~ the bonds to be issued aud guaranteed their payment, and took the bonds
when so issued and now hold them.
(6) That they virtually own and control the Atlantic and Pacific
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Company and all its property, together with its mortgag·e aud bonded
indehtedne~s; aml are holding them and allowing the company to
maintain a mere nominal existence.
We have uow given a brfef history of the facts connected with this
grant fhnn its beginning to the prP-sent time, passing over a period of
uearly eighteen years and extendiug nearly eiglit years beyond the time
:vhen tl1e main line should have lJeen completed to enable them to control the la11d grant at pleasure under their construction of the law.
The rules of law governing tbis grant are simihtr to those goyerniug
Qther grants beretofore reported by yo,ur committee.
The granting act iu its main features is almost an exact copy of the
act making the grant to the Northern Pacific Company, and what we
said in that case is also applicable in this.
·
The third section of tbe act contains the following language:
That there be, and hereby is, granted to the Atlantic and Pacitic Hailroad Company * * * every alternate section of public lands, not mineral, designated by odd
numbers, &c.

Tlie eiglith and ninth sections read as follows:
8. And be it fnrther enacted, That each aud every grant, right, and privilege
bereiu are :,;o made and given to and accepted hy said Atlantic and Pacific Railroad
Company, npon all(l subject to the following conditions, namely: That the said com·
pany shall commence the work on Raid road within t.wo years from the approval of
"this act by the President, and shall complete not less tbau f>O miles per year after the
econd year, and t;hall conHtrud, equip, furnil>h, and complete the main line of the
whole road by the 4th day of Jnly, A. D. 187tl.
HEC. 9. And be it jtwfher enacted, "That the United States make· the several conditional grants herein, and that the eaid Atlantic ~nd Pacific Railroad Company a<'cept
thb Harne, upon the further condition that if the said company make an~' breach of the
-eonditious lwn'of, and allow the same to continue for upwards of one year, then, in
JSuch caHe, at any time hereafter, the United Stat<>s may do any and all acts and things
which may be needful and necessary to insure a speedy c~mpletion of the said road.
SEC.

"\Vbatever may baYe been the earlier rulings upon the subject, it IS
-clear that under the third, eighth, and uiuth sections just quoted the
Atlantic and Pacific Uompany took at the date of the act an estate in
presenti upon conditions subsequent. (Rutherfonl 'l?S. Green's heirs, 2
Wheat; Loni8sen 'llS. Price, 1~ Howard, 59; Schulenberg vs. Harriman, 21
Wall., 149; Van \Vyck vs. Kuevals) 16 Otto; { pinion of Attorney-Gen.
oeral Devens, 16; Jpinion Attorney General Brewster, Ex. Doc. 31, hit
sess. 48tll Congress; Leaven worth, &c., R. R. Co. vs. U. S., 92 U. S.
Reports, 741.)
'l'hiH bei11g· a grant in pTesenti, ,·esting the title of the lands described
iu tbe g-rant in tbe company as we haYe shown, the question arises
how that title can be divested. In the case of Sclmlenberg vs. Harriman,
.above eited, it is held that it requires an act of Congress declaring a
forfeiture iu order to dh~est tlle company of the title. As tlle law now
tands CongrPss must take the initiative by eitller declaring a forfeiture
by din'ct emwtment to that effect, or it must pass a law conferring jurisdictiou 011 the courts. J n other words, it l'leems that u11der tlle opinion
in the case of Schuleu berg vs. Harriman, that Congress has the exclusive
~urisdiction to declare a forfeiture.
It is lleld in the case of Farusworfh
fJS. Minnesota a11d Pacific Railroad Uompauy, 92 U. S., page 66, thatA forft>itnr<' hy the State of an interest iu laucls apd connected franchises, granted
for the con1-tmetion of a public work, may be declared for non-compliance with the
-conditions anw·xerl to their grant or their pos~ession, wlwn forfeiture is provided by
8tatute, 'vithout jndicial proeeeclitJ~S to ascertain aud determine the failure of the
grantee to perfor111 the co ~ <1ition!-i.

Confirming the rnl6 laid down in the abo,·e-cited case~'~.
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Your committee ·have uniformly held that Congress possesses the
power to declare these gTants forft>ited, awl have reported several bills
for that purpose, two of which have already passed tbe House. And
we may state, also, that of all the learned counsel who have appeared
befme us none of them have taken issue with the law as we have just
stated it. They all agree that Oongref's has jurisdiction to declare a
forfeiture in all such cases.
The question rest'l upon a conMruction of sections 3, 8, and 9. The
attorneys for the company claim that they constitute an absolute dedicatiou of the lands to tl.Je purpose of construction and maiutenance of
the road. They contend that there is no condition subsequeut wllatever, and that the only power in tl.Je United States is the power through
Congress to adopt such measures as may be nece.--sary to iusurP. a speedy
completion of the ro:::td in case the company fails .to lmil<l it.
The tl1ird, fifth, eighth, and ninth sections of the act we are here
cousiderin~ are in substance the same as the like numbered sections in
the Northern Pacific grant; and what your committee said in the report
made by Judge Henley to the Honse at the present session in that case
is equally applicable in this; therefore we adopt it., as follows:
On the other hand, your committee regard this coustrnction as utterly untenable,
and are clearly of rhe opinion(!) That section H of the act declares a condition subsequent, viz, that the road
!lhall be completed within a certain time, upon breach of which the grantor may declare a forfmtnre.
(2) That ~'ection 9 is in no way repugnant to section 1'3, but while embracing all that
is included therein, and to that extent perhaps cumulative, is also, iu connection with
section 5, a declaration of .fu1·ther and additional conditions snhsec1uent, for breach of
whi<;h Congress may interfere to protect the rights of t.he Unit.ed States.
(3) That nnrler either of :-;aid sections, or hoth together, the United States, uy Congress, bas the right to declare the grant forfeited for failure t.o build the road within
the limitation,

•

I.

Section 8 is perfectly plain in the language used and the purpose contemplated. It
declares m so many words that the grant made is given by the United States and accepted b .v the comp:,1.ny "subj• cr to the fullowinq conditions, namely, that the said company * * '" shall constrnct, equip, fnrnish, anrl c;omplete the whole road," &c.
Thi8 is too plain for any construction. Congress intended to provide, arHl did provide, that. tlle road should be completed within a certain time, and that that should be
a condition of the grant. If a condition, the grant is determinable upon its breach,
at the option of the grantor.
The argument of the company rests upon the absence of express worcls declaring
a reversion in case of the breach. That, in 1he judgment of your committPe, was entirely unnecessary in orrler to create an est ate n pon condition subsequent. The estate,
so conditioned, is created by declaring the condition, not by declaring the result of its
breach The latter, re-entry or its eqni valent, follows as matter of legal effect. Every
lawyer knows the result of a breach of c01ulition subsequent, and the statement of
that result in any grant adds uot.hing to t.he previous description of the estate created.
The laud does'' revert" by operation of law upon t.he breach being enforced by reentry or .its equivalent; but the right to that re-entry depends upon no express provision that the laud shall r~\~ert. It stant1s upon the condition declared and its breach.
Upon this point we quote from tbe report of t.be Pnulic Lands • ·omrmttee, made a.t
this session of Congress upon the bill forfeiting the Tf>xas Pacific land grant, reported
to the House hy Jndge Payson :
"In other words, generally stated, the di~tinguished counsel for the company declares that in law the power to declare a forfeiture of a grant. made on condition subsequent for hreach of the condition mnst be reserved to the grantor by express terms
in the act making t.he grant, or it does not exist.
•: No authority was produced to the committee except the statement of the attorneys
asserting this extraordinary doctrine in snpport of it; but. the interest.s being so great,
- we have examined the books on the question, and are not able to find a single authority in support of the proposition, and we believe none can be fonnd.
"On the contrary, Washburn on Real Property, vol. ~'3d ed., p. 15, asserts the rule
to be, 'Where the condition of a grant is express there i~:~ no need of reserving a right
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of entry for a breach thereof in order to enable the grantor to avail himself of it.'
(See als(l Jackson vs. Allen, :3 Cowan, 220; Gray vs. Blanchard, tl Pick., 2tl4; Littleton,
sec. 331.)
"Indeed, all the decided cases we can find, as well as the text-books. are in harmony
and to the same effect; so we do not present argument upon it here."
The estate is created by proper words of description declaring the condition, and
tlw legal effect of what follows tl1e hrPach is exactly the same whether it be described
in the grant or not. Thus in the ease nndt-r consideration thP estate upon condition
iR created by the specific language med. Tl;le legal effect. of reversion follows the
breach and declaration of forfeiture. No provision that the laud should revert was
necessar~·, and if added would simply base debcl'l bed the legal result of what preceded it.
The Touchstone, page 122, thus describes the operative words creating an estate
on condition:
"Conditions annexed to estates are sometimes so placed and confounded among
covenants, soiretimes so ambiguously drawn, and at all times have m th ... ir drawing
so much affinity with limitatious, that it is bard to discern and dist.ingnish them.
Know, therefore, for the most part cond·, tions have conditional words in their frontispiece, and do begin therewith, and that among these words there are three words that
are most proper, which in their own nature and efficacy, without any addition of othe1·
1l'Ords of 1·e·entry in the conclusion of the condit-ion, do mai<.e the estate conditio Gal, as
proviso, ita quod, a11d sub conditione."
Washburn, in hi,.; work on Rt'al Property, lllarginal page 445, says:
"Among the formR of expression wllich imply a condition in a grant the writers
give the fo11owing: 'On condition,' 'provided always,' ·if it shall so happen,' or, 'so
that the grantee pay, &e., witl1iu a specified time,' and grants made upon auy of
tllese terms vest. a conditional estate in the grantee."
When t.he condition of a grant is expre:-s, there is no necessity of reserving a, right
of entry for breach of the condition in order to enable the grantor to take adv< ntage
of it. (Jackson 1·s. Allei1, :~Cow., 2:20; Gray vs Blanchard, 8 Pick., 284.)
That tbe words "upon condition," and eYen words less specifical1y expressing the
intent, are constrned as ef'tablishing :m estate upon, condition subsequent, without
further description, is Rhown b.\' many authorities. (Littleton, pp. 328, :3:Z9, :3:{0, Com.
Dig. Condition A 2; 2 ·w ood, Com. PowPII's eel., 505,512, et seq.; Wheeler V8. Wafker,
2 Conu., 201; Tlwmas vs. Record, 477 Me., f>Otl; Sharon Iron Co. vs. Erin, 41 Penn.
St .. 341; Taylor· V8, Ceclar Rapid R. R. Co., 25 Iowa, :171; Attorney-General V8. Merrimack Co., 14 Gra~·, fi12; Hadl . . y rs. HadiPy, 4 Gray, 14fl; Raw~o;on V8. Scbool l>istrict,
7 Allen, 128; Caw vs. Robert~:o,on, 1 Seldm1, 125; Pickle v.s. McK\Isick, 21 Penn. St .,
23:2; Hooper VB. Cummings, 4fl Me., 359; Chapin vs. School, :{5 N. li., 450; W1ggin VB.
Berry, 2 Poster, 114; Hayden vs. Stoughton, 5 Pick., 534; Wright vs. Tuttle, 4 Day,
3:26.)

Authorities upon this point might he multiplied. It is t.he construction of principlt'· antl authority, and yonr committee have been referred to no case which iu t.heir
juogment militates at all against the position here assumed. Tbe Touchstone, at
page 122, immediately following tbe quotation which we have made, is suggested as
mo(lifying the authority of the citation in its appljca,bility to the case under consideration. But no snch effect can possibly he giveu the language u:sed. After stating
the broad proposition quoted, the writer proceeds to say that although the words mentioned are "the most proper words to make conoi tions," yet that they are sometimes
used for other purposes. He tllen points out instances where the word "proviso" in
certain particular relations may he given a di-fferent meaning. Bnt the entire discussion is limited to that particular word-does not once mention the words "Bub conditione," or name a single instance where thPy are used in a sense contrary to the general
rule, and even in respect to the word "pTot"iso" the exception could not apply to the
case unuer consideration, for it is expressly limited to a use of tiJe word where it does
not stand "originally, by and of itself."
The other authorities to which we have bflen referred are not in any sense repilgnant. to the view of the law we adopt. They are few in numbers, and at the best
simply hold that these apt words may, in certain instances, be restricted by immediate referenct-~ to other portions of the deed clearly expressing a di:ffertnt intent in
the grantor. That this is true is not denied; bnt. it does not change the general rule,
and its applicahility to the case under cousiflerat.iou will!Jlore properly be noticed
hereafter.
w·e an~, therefort>, clearly of the opinion that section 8 of the act., by the express
language nsed, created an estate upon condition subsequent, forfeitable upon breach
of the condition.

II.

Section 9 of the act, while perhaps embracing the preceding section within its provisions. and pobsiuly to that extent cnmulativt->, is also a provisio11 prescribing certain ot•tH:·r and additional conditions subsequent.

1
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It will be noticerl at the outset that by its specific language it embraces more than
one grant, the exact. words being "the several conditioned g1·ants herein'' and that it relates to a "further" condition. The "further" condition was that if the eompany
shonld make any breach of" t,he conditions hereof" and the same shonld continue for
a year, then the United 8tates might, &c. Now, it is obvious upon the mere reading
that this language does not primarily relate to section S, for that section only appertains to one grant., needs no "furt,her" condition, and the provision that the defa,ult
should continue for a year or upwards would have no pertinence. This section
evidently relates to some other condition or conditions than that mentioned in section 8.
These other conditions or requirements are found in sect_ion 5, which provides that
six separate and distinct things should be done by the company, viz: 1st, that the
road should be constructed in a substantial and workmanlike manner, equal in all
respects to first-class railroads ; 2d, that it should be made of rails of the best quality,
manufactured from American iron; 3d, that a uniform gauge should be established
throughout the entire line; 4th, that the company should construct a telegraph liue
of the most improved and substantial description; 5th, that it should not charge the
Government higher rates than individuals; and 6th, that it should permit other railroads to make running connections on fair and reasonable terms. These are the other
and further couclitions mentioned by section 9, in default of any of which, continuing
for a year, Cougress should have the right to "d~ any and all acts and things,. to
secure t.he "spet>dy cornple1ion of the said road," as contemplated and provided.
The intent of Congress, expre~secl with abundant precision in the act itself, and, as
every one knows, as a matter of history, was to insure the construction, within the
time prescribed, of a. substantial, first-class, and thoroughly equipped railroad from
Lake Superior to the Pacific, suitable and available in all emHgencies for use by the
United Statt>s-in peace for tbe transmission of its mails; in war for the carrying of
troops and supplies. Congrt'ss dicl not donate 48,000,000 acres of the public domain
to this company without exrwctiog and requiring some equivalent. Among the things
it did require was the c•~nstruction of a first-class road for the purposes and in the
manner indicaterl. It accordingly prescribrd the various requirements above recitedt
and to insure obedience to its mandates it provided by section 9 that in defan]t of any
of the same Cougress might do anything necessary to complete the road in the manner
contemplated and prt>scribed. The enactment of these provisions would have been
futile had no reservation been made of a right to enforce them. Wit.hout such a reservation the Government, upon default of the company, would have had nothing left
except a claim against the company for breach of contract or of covenant. To prevent
such a condition of affairs the right was reserved to further legisla.te to compel ouedience to its mandates. These requirements then became additional conditions subsequent, which Congress conld enforce by fodeitnre or by any other remedy deemed appropriate and aclt>quate. That was the object, scope, and intent of section 9, ancl it is
expressed in unambignons phrase.
It is no answer 1o this proposition to say that these requirements might be enforced
by the general forfeiture provided by section t3.
The road might have been built within the time limited and yet every one of these
conditions been broken. Tlw grant conld not then have been forfeited at a)l under
section 8 A 1:oad would have been completrd, and though built in absolute disregard of a1l the requirements of section 5, the Govermnent would have been powerless
either to resume the grant or compel the company to perform the condition. That
section 9 relates to other conditions than that mentioned in section 1'l is also apparent
from the u~e of the words "and allow the bame to continue for upwards of one year."
These words, if applied to the conditions mentioned in section 5, mean something. If
applied to section 8 they are nonsensical. If Congress hatl intended to extend the
pei iod mentioned in section 8 one year, it would have said Jnly 4, 1877; not July 4,
li:l76, and another year thereafter.
It is thus apparent that section 9 of the act has a scope and effect far beyonfl ·anything embraced by sectiou 8; that it legislated upon further and additional sn hjects;
has a separate and distinct function of its own, and that instead of limiting or controlling the preceding section H creates additional obligations and liability on the
part of the company.
The only answer to this posit.ion advanced _by the company is the suggestion that if
this be true tbrn the two sections are ntterly inconsistent with each other. It is difficult. to nnderstand how this can he seriously urged. We have already shown a different legal scope and operation f"r each under the constrnction we have adopted.
They are not repugnant or inconsistent in the slightest degree. Each stands for its own
particular purpose. On the other ha11d, the construction contended for by the company would violate \Yell established rule'~ of construction simply to disregard the
plainly expressed intent of Congress. ThP.y cl;;~,irn that the two sections should be
taken together, and t,bat so taken all that Congn·ss could do upou failure of the company to lmild the road would be to take all neces~:>ary steps to compel its completion
without power to forfeit the grant.
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This pos1tion is nut,enable nmler the rnies of constructiou hecanl'le, first, it assumes
an ambiguity. :Ul(l then to reconcile H rejects the usual and ordinary sig11ification of
terms and phras<>s; twice reads as singular a ''ord in the plural, and cou~:>trnes "further
condition" as if the '"ord "fnrtlwr" was omittNl; second, with reference to a simple
time eonditiou, viz, that the road should be built by July 4, lt)7ti, it aclfls the seuseless
expression, "provided the stuue shall co11tinue nnbnilt one ;year"; third, it exdudes
all of Rectiou 3 frotu its relation~:> anll conuectious \vith section 9 aud eitlwr n ·jects it
t•ntir<'ly or makes it practically inopPrative: fourth, 11 violatPs the maui fPst g(•ueral
intent of the en1 ire ad and the geuc>ral polic~' of Congref'S prevailing at tlw time in
respect to these gnmts.
Another c<msidt•ration is to be noticed. The provision of section 9 is pt>rmh;sive
or directory only. Cougress may do all neces~;ary things, &c. It is not mandatory,
as it would have been if intencled as the sole l't' lllC(lv for the hrt>ach of the condition
of seci ion ti. So, too, it i:s not exclnsi ve ot otlwr re;nedif's for the breach. Congress
may in tlwt way enforce the forfeiture or may do it otherwiHe.
\Ve ha' e l1een reft-ITe(l to :some authorities which are snpposerl to Hnstain the forced
con"'trnctiou of the act contended for, but after the most carefnl examination of
them we are unable to recognize any dodriue contrary to that we hav1~ adopted for
our guidance. The strongest cited are undoubtedly the cases of the Episcopal Mission 1'8. Appleton et al. (17 Mass., 326), and Stauley t'B. Colt (f> Wall., lHl). They do
not establish any new doctrine or any principle repugnant to the authority of the
long line of c::i es we haYe cited.
In the former, the supreme court of Massachusetts, speaking of a volnutar~· deed
for charitable purposes, say :
''Altho11gh the words 'upon condition' in a conveyance of real estate are apt words
to create a eomlition, any breach of which will forfejt the • strtte, yet they are uot to
be allowed that ctrect \Yhen the intention of the grantor, as manifPsted by the whole
deed, is otherwise."
And in the latter, the Supreme Court t•f the United States, speaking of a devise for
certain charitable purposes, say:
"It is true the word 'proviso' is an appropriate one to eonstitnte a common-law
condition in a dead or will; but this i~:> not the fixed and invariable meaning attached
toitby the law in theRe instruments. On the contrary, it gives way to the inteut of
the parties as gathered from au examination of the whole instrnnwnt," &c.
The principle announced by these decisions is simply the. univPrsal rule of con~trnc
tion giving cflect to the real intent of the parties to an instrument when the same can
be fairly ascertained from the language used. In other wor(ls, that technical expreRsions aml phrases onlinarily yield to a contrary plainly expresbe<l intc11t. But the
principle has no applicability to the case under consideration, for there is no intent,
either expressed or1'o he reasonably implit·d, contrary to the technical meaning of the
words "upon condition." On the contrary, the act from beginning to end di:splays
in every line a most deliberate, well considered, ancl matured intention not to bestow
thi:s princely gift without so circumscribing and limiting the company by these conditions as to seem·~ the object, and every object,, whieh Congress had in view. It
shows the clearest intention in the miud of Congress to create a condition subsequent,
forfeiting the grant for failure to build the road within the prescribed pPriod; and
also other conditions subsequent, putting it in the power of Congress, even after the
road had been built, to enforce the requirements of the act touching the manner of
its construction. In the jndgment of your committee, there is not a word in the act
indicative of an intent to limit or curtail the technical words of condition used.
And astde from the language of the act itself, it is incredible that Congress could
have mtended, in this probably the largest and most valuable grant of lands ever
made to a railroad company or a State, to depart from the uniform and uninterrupted
policy of legislation for y ... ars, and allow the company to appropriate this vast belt
of the public domain without restriction, reserva~ion, or control. Your committee
cannot subscribe to such a doctrine and can find no argument, even plansihle, to support it. We are clearly of opinion that Congress intended to provifle for a forfeiture
upon failure to build the road within the prescribed period, and that the language
used was abundantly sufficient in law to accomplish that intent.

III.
Your committee are also well satisfied that even under se<:tiou 9 of the act, in the
11ense in which it is construed by the company, Congress had aud has the power to
declare a forfeiture. It is conpeded that under it Congress can flo any and all acts
and things neN1fn I an clnecPssary to insure a t:~peedy completion of the road. Congress
is the sole and exclusiYe judge of whether the road has at, any time, in point of fact,
been completed; and if not, what remedy should be applied. The remerly of forfeiture is included within the general power reserved. The road is in fact uncompleted
to this Clay. Congress can now, by virtue of that very reservation, so strenuously in-
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sistecl upon by the company as protecting the gran~, declare the same forfeited and
restored to the public domain. Might not the forfeiture of the grant 111 the bands of
this company and the cmJseqnent crPation of an opeu fi·el<l for eqnal competition best
t:Jondnce to the speedy ultimate complt>tion of tlw entire line? If Congress so view
the matter, there can be no doubt of irs power to declare the forfeiture nuder the
very clause of the act relie<l npon by the compauy for its protection.
OTHER OBJECTIONS URGED AGAINS'l' THE FORFEI'l'URE CONSIDERED.

The granting act was silent upon the authority of the company to
mortgage its grant. And it is insisted that doubts were entertained
among capitalists as to whether the company could make a mortgage
without this authority was exprt"ssed by Congress, and this greatly embarrassed and prevented the utilization of the grant to raise money for
the construction of the road. Hence, the company urged Congress to
pass an act on April 20, 1871 (Stat., vol. 17, p. 19) granting expr,ess authority to the company to ~o mortgage. Aud after asking and getting
this act passed, \vh1ch was said to be so necessary to aid the company
in raising money to build the road, it is now insisted that it presents an
additional reason that it was intended by Congress to create a trust
fund to build this road with conditions that if the compauy did not apply the fund to the preseribt>d nse within a specified time, or if the
mortgagee~ of the said company did uot so apply the same within auother specified time, that then the Govmnment might take auy and all
steps to secure its i11tended application, so far as it had not previously
been applied.
This is a strange construction to be placed upon the act. Not a single
authority is cited by the able counsel for t.he company in support of it;
and we ve11tur·e to assert none can be found in any respedable law
book in the land. No trust is created, either express or implied, in the
act; uo trustee is named or provided for, for uone exists, and we will
not, therefore, waste time in producing argument and citing authorities
against this misconstruction.
Aft.er giving tile ~xpress right to mortgage, the act of April, 20 1871,
above referred to, contains the following proviso:
P1·ovided, That if the company shall hereafter su:JI'er any brea'1h of tlle conditions
of the act. al•ove referred to, under which it is organized, tlle rights of those claiming
under an,y mort.gage made by the company to the ~an!ls granted to it hy said act shall
extend only to as much thPreofas shall be. coterminous with or appertain to that part
of sai!1 road which shall have been constructed at the tirne of the foreclosm·e of 8aid
mm·tgage.

The attorneys for tla->· trustees of the boudholders under the first
mort,g·age made by the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company as~ume:
1st. That this prodso is equivalent to a declaration that on default
made by the compan,Y in compl~ying with any of the couditions of the
grant, the mortgagt>es should have the rigat to all the lands embraced
in the grant which were coterminous with the completed road at the
time ot'foreclosnre.
If this construction is the correct one, and, as we have shown, the
mortgageors and mortgagt"es are the Saiut Louis and San Francisco
and the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad Uompanies, and that
these two companies I.Jave constructed and are operating and controlling all the road which has been completed (except the 34 miles), then
they have complt>te control of the grant. They cau hold it for a hun- dred years without completing another mile of road, and the Government can do nothing, n9 matter lww many breaches of the contract
may be committed.

•
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We do not agree with the learned counsel in this construction of the
proYiso. If they are conect why should Oollgres8 say" tilat if the company 1-\ufl'er any breach of the conditions of th<> act" under which it was
organized the rights of thm;e claiming niHler any mortgage made by the
comp:·m:v shonld extend only to the lands coterminon~ with completed
road~
vVhy not bave ~mid that the right of those claiming under auy
mortgage made by tbe company to the lands granted to it by saitt act
shall t>xtend only to so much thereof as is coterminous with the completed road at the tim<> of the foreclosure of said mortgage¥
If this language had beeu used an<l none other the construction contended for would be eorrect But this language was substautiaJlJT used,
and also the other language Ret forth in the proviso, which destroys
the eonstructiou lllace(l upon it by the attorneys of the mortgagees;
and which, in the opinion of your committee, clearly shows that it was
tue legislatiYe intent to limit the rights of the mortgag·ees to the lands
coterminous with the completed road at tile date of the b;·ecwh of conditions set forth in the original act, and not at the date of the foreclosure
of the mortgage. This we think is tile clear legal pxpresswn ot tlle act.
Any other construction would destroy the etl'ect of one-i1alf of the
laugnage in the pro,~iso by treating it as surplusage. ~rhi8 cannot be
done here without violating the rnleH of com;trnctiou and tllereby doing
great injustice to the Government.
If the eonstruction thus placed upon this proviso be correct Oongre~s
has the rig;ilt to forft>it all the lands grauted without reganl to the
mortgage, for it was t>xecuted after breach of the conditions subsequent
had occurred. 'l'he mortgagees acquired no rights under the mortgage
which could prevent Congress from declaring a forfe ture. They knew
of the breach and took their chanceR.
But it is further insisted that this act of Congress last referre(l to
authorized the company to execute a mortgage on its property and
franchises, and issue bonds, and is therefore in the nature of a waiver
or bar to the power of Congress to do any act by which the interests of
the mortgagees may be affected detrimentally.
This position is not tenable. OongreRs, by the passage of said act,
did not authorize the company to mortgage the unconditional fee; but,
upon the contrary, e:rvressly reserved all the cond it·ions expressed in the
o1·iginal act. The company d1d. not own the unconditional fee in the
lands granted. It owned the fee charged with the conditions subsequent, and it could mortgage and the mortgagees eonld only take
under the mortgage such estate as the company owned at the time the
mortgage was executed.
The mortgagees mnst be held to haYe known that they were taking
an estate whith was defeasible upon condition broken. They stand in
the place of the mortgageor. There being a breach of the conditions
8Ubsequent by the failure of the company to cornplete its road within
the time fixed by tile grant t.he mortgagees must take whate,·er consequences a fOifeiture imposes, which is the loss of the <ld'easible estate
in so much of the lands granted by the third section of the granting
act as the bill aceompanying this report provides for. They will still
retain if the bill passes their lien on the right of way, &c., granted by
the ~w(·oml section of said act.
That we are dght in these conclusions we think the <~utborities abundantly show. In Kent (vol. 4, p. 1~5) the rule is laid down as follows:
Per~->ons who have au estate or freehold subject to a condition are seized and may
convey, though the estate will continue defeasible until the co11dition be performed
or releasNl, or is barred by the statnte of limitation, or by estoppel.
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Greenleaf's Cruise on Real Property (vol. 2, pp. 4!, 52) thus lays <lown
the doctriue :
\Vhere a person enters for a condition broken the estate becomes void ab initio; the
person who enter.s is again seized of his original estate in the same 1nanner as ~f' he had ne1;er
com.:e.11ed it a1cay. Aud as the entry of the feoffer on the feoffee for a condition broken
def~ats the estate to which the condition was annexed, so it defeaiB all1'i[Jids and incidents ann1 xed to that estate together with all charges and Pncu.ntln'ances c1·eated b.tl the feoffee
dut·ing his posBession ; fm· upon the entry of the feoffel' he bwomes seiznl of an estate paramount to that wlur.h was su~ject to thesr, charges.

Washburn ou Real Property iR to the same effect (vol. 2, p. 11 [marginal page 45]) :
\Vhen snch entrv had been made the effect wa:s to rednce the estate to the same
plight, and to cause it to be held in the same terms as if the e::~tate to which the condition was auuexecl had not been granted.
QUES'l'ION OF TIME MORE FULLY CONSIDERED.

The time withiu which a conditiou subsequeut is to be performed is,
in this ca~e, as much the @Ssence of the coutract as any other part or requirement of the conditiou. Not even equity will relieve against failure
to perform within the time allowed a couditiou subsequeut. EspAcially
is this so when tbe time for the performance of the condition is fixed
by statute, as in this case. (In Farnesworth vs. M. and P.R. R. Co., 2
Otto, 49; 2 Story, Equity Juris., 103; 26 Willard's Equits Juris., 13~4;
3 Washburn on Heal Property, 17, m. p. 455.) Nor where parties have
fixed the time of performing the coutract, unless sometimes in case of
sale of hmd for money and damages for delay is mere matter of computation of interest. (Boardman ·vs. Imrick, 10 Cal., 96; 2 White &
Tudor's Leading Cases in Eq., 1105; 2 Jones on Mortgages, 1185; 2 Washburn on Real Property, 17.) The grant being one iu presenti with conditiou subsequent, on failure to perform the con<lition within the time
stipulated the right to declare a forfeiture became perfect. A condition not performed within the specified time when time is a part of the
condition can never be performed.
A railroad to be built by the 4th day of July, 1878, cannot after
that date•be lmilt within that time.
Time in this case was of the essence of the condition :
(1) Because it wa"' expressly stipulated;
(2) Because it was fixed by statute;
(3) Because the ,~alue of the laud would increase by lapse of time; and,
(4) Because the object of the grant was to promote the early development of an unsettle<l portion of the country. Any onfj of these is
sufficient to make time the essence of the conditions subsequent. (See
Pumroy on Contracts, sees. 3H3, 384, 385, 386.)
Tbe withdrawal of a large body of land, amountiug to many millions
of acres, from market and settlement without the building of the road,
retards, instea<l of promotes, the development of the country, and therefore defeats the very object of the grant. Congress does not make grants
to aid in the construction of a 1il0ad in portions of the country already well
settled, nor does it authorize lands to be withdrawn from market and
held in reservation or in trust to be given as a reward for the construction of a road after the country is well settled, for in thickly settled regions railroads will be built without Government aid.
We have already shown by authorities cited that. when time of performanc~ is fixed in the instrument, or by statute, or is of the essence
of the condition, or compensatton for breach cannot be made-and all
/
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these elements are contained in this condition-it must be strictly performed. whether it is a cotHlition precedent or subsequent.
(J. Broom and lladley's Com., G02 (vVaits'~ ed.), Note :277; 2. Redfield
on WillR, 28H, note; Taylor's Latallm·d and Temmt, p. 240, sec. 282;
1. Bonvie1's Institutes, 759, 760; 'l'~·ler on BjPctments, 179.)
A forfeiture for breacb of condition may be waived. But a wai·ver
cannot. be impli~d by silence. (B. and M. H. H. Co. 1'8. Boestlerl 15 Iowa,
125; Jackson 1w. Brock, 1 Johnson':-- Cases, 125; Lawrence vs. Gifford,
17 Pick., 3oG; Pike 'DS. Entler, 4 N. Y., 360.)
Nor is a forfeiture wain,d by <lelay in euforciug it. (Gray vs. Blanchani, 8 Pick., 284:; PeQ t's. Davis, 3 U. B. (N. S.), 769; Doe 118. Allen,
3 Taunt, 78; Calderwood vs. Brook~, 28 Ual., 151.)
It must be remembered that the will or intent of Congress can never
be implied from silence. It m nst always be ascertaiued from enactments and resolutions. No waiver of forfeiture can he presumed by
Congress, unless such waiver is made by statute or resolution, either
expressly or by fair implication from the provisions expressed.
In construing public grants, all doubts wllich exist are to be resolved
in favor of the GoYermnent and againRt the grantee.
OBLIGATION OF 'l'HE GOVERN}IEN1.' IN: REGARD TO INDIAN 'l'ITLE.

It is as~erted by the attorneys of the company that the Government
obligated itself, by the granting act, to extinguish the ludian title and
survey the lands in the Indian Territory; and they claim that both were
indispensable to the complete utilization of tile grant by its beneficiary.
The realization of aid from the grants pledged by Congress to secure
the construction of the road, and the pot:~sibility of reimbursement by
profitable carrying-trade in tbe operation of a constructed road, were
necessarily dependent upon the promised change in the legal conditions
of the laud title~ along the prescribed route of the proposed road.
·They insist tllat the United States has n,ot even attempted to fulfill its
promise to extinguish the Indian titles.
All tllis is insisted upon with a pretended belief that it is based upon
a fair construction of the granting act. The general route of the road,
as prescribed by tllis act, runs from the west 1ine of the State of Missouri for 350 miles through the Indian Territory, which was prior to
said grant set apart b--;y" the Government for the benefit of the Indians.
The ultimate fee is vested in tile United States, but which, by treaty
stipulations, statutory enactments, and executive acts thereunder, have
been set apart and reserved for the sole use :-tnd occupancy of certain
Indian nations and tribes so long as their national or tribal organizations are preserved. The bound~ries of this section of country are
defined by various treaties with these nations and tribes, and by legiRlative acts whieh prescribe the limits of the contiguous States and
Territories of the Union. The public-land system bas never been extended over it. Congress has never taken any action to have it surveyed as public land. Much of it is held by four nations, the Choctaw,
Chickasaw, Cherokee, and Creek, who have patents in accordance with
treaties aud laws, and all attempts to induce Congress to organize it
into a Territory of the United States have, up to this time, failed.
'l'bis is enough to show tllat the company has no grant of laud in this
Territory, neither present or prospective, in our opinion. None was in·
tended to be conferred by the act, ex~ept a~ such grant might be acquired from the 1udians by said company. Let us examine the granting act for a moment.
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'rhe preteuded claim of the company for the survey of the lauds in
this Territory i~ "based upon the fourth and sixth sectious of the act.
If these sections stood alone and could be considered by themsehTes, or
in eonuection witL only the last clause of the second section; if there
were no limitatious to the grant as made by the third l'lectiou, and if
the seventeenth section was no part of the law, there might be some
plausibility in the claim that the fourth and sixth sections required that
the lands be survPyed as fast as the road was completed. But if we
consider the law as a whole, as enacted, the claim is without foundation.
Under the thinl section the land to pass under the grant must be
public land. situated in a 'l'erritory or State, the tit.]e of which is in the
United States, arHl which bas not been sold or otherwise appropl'iated
at the time the map of location of the route of its road is filed in the
General Land Office.
The lands in the Indmn Territory are not public lanus in the usual
meaning of that term, and are uot situated in a State or Territory of
the U oited States. Certainly the United States, so far as the lands
within the boundaries of the Choctaw, Chickasaw, Cherokee, Creek,
and Seminole Nations are concerned, does not possess full title to them;
for they were, prior to the _year 1866, the date of the granting act, set
apart and reserved by the United States for the sole use and occupancy
· of various Indian nations and tribes. Therefore, Lhe claim that these
lands were included in the grant under the third section cannot be
maintained.
Your committee is of the opinion, after a careful examination of the
whole act, that no land was granted to the company in the Indian Territory except such as might be acquired by the company from the Indians by virtue of the seYenteenth sectLon. This section authorized the
company to accept any grant from an Indian tribe or nation through
whose reservation it~ road might pass, ~mbject to the approval of the
President of the United States. 'l'his is the privilege conferred by. the
act, and ~e believe that the last clause of the second section only becomes applicable when this is done:
And "the United States shall extinguish, as rapidly as may be consistent with public policy and the welfare of the Indians, and only by their voluntary cession, the
Indian title to all lands falling under the operation of this act and ac<] uired in the
donation to the road named in the act."

The company at the beginning acted upon this construction of the
law. This i~ fully shown by the files of the Interior Department.
It askedpermis~ion of the Interior Department, and lea,Te was granted
to open negotiations with some of the Indian tribes to effect a grant of
lands, but was not successful in its efforts with the Indians. Thus the
company by its acts admitted that there were no lands gr.anted to it
other than the right of way which was provided for in the treaties between the Government and the Indians.
The company never set up any claim that it received any land by the
grant in the Indian Territory until the year 1877 -eleven years after the
act was passed.
The Interior Department holds that no lands were granted to this
company iu the Indian Territory. This has heen the uniform ruling of
that Department on the subject. It was the ruling of the Ron. J. A.
Williamson, while he was Commissioner of the General Land Office,
who is now attorney for the company.
Your committee therefore finds that there is nothing in the claim of
the attorneys of the company that the Government has failed in ex-
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tinguishing the Indian titles and surveying the lands in the Indian
Territory, as no grant of land was made to the company in said Territory.
We therefore, in vit>w of the law and facts set forth in this report,
recommend the passage of the accompanying; bill as a subHtitnte for
all bills introduced in the Honse for the forfeiture of the land grant
made to the .Atlantic and Pacific Hailroad Company.
A BILL to forfeit the unearnetllands granted to the .Atlantic and Pac{fic Railroad Company "to aid
in the construction of a railroad and telegraph line from the States of Missouri and Arkansas to the
Pacific coast," and to restore the same to settlement, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Smwte and House of Repreaeutatives of the United States of Amm·ica

in Conyre.,s assembled, That all the lands, excepting the right of way heretofore granted
to the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company by an act entitled "An act granting
lands to aid in the constrnctiou of a railroad and telt·graph line from the States of
Missouri and Arkau:;as to the faeific coast," approved. July 27, 1866, and subsequent
acts and joint resolutions of Congres>\, which are adjacent to and coterminous with
the uncompleted portio11s of the main line of said road, embraced withiu both the granted
and in<lemni ty limits, as contempl:.Lt.ed to be constructed nnder and by the provisions
of the said act of July 27, 1866, and aets and joint resolutions subsequent thereto,
and relating to the construction of said road and telegraph, be, and the same are
hereby, declared forfeited and restored to the public domain, and made subject to disposal under the general laws of the United States, as though said grant had never
been made: P1·ovided, That the price of the lauds so forfeited and restored shall be
$1.25.
And p1·odded, That nothing in this act shall be held to impair any right that the
United States may have in or to the lands not forfeitable by thi~ aet.

VIEWS OF THE MINORITY.
[To accompany bill H. R. No. 453.]

The undersigned members of the Committee 011 Public Lands submit
the following as the views of the minority:
We agree substantially to all the findings and statement of facts
made by a majority of the committee, and upon them and the authorities cited we respectfully submit to the House that Congress has the
power and ought to declare a forfeiture of all the lands granted to the
road except that coterminous with the34 mites of road cowpleted within
the time fixed by the granting act. .Almost every condition fixed by
the act of J nly 27, 1866, was broken, and all of the benefits sought to
be accomplished by Congress by the grant have been lost to the coulltry. By a11 ingenious system of trading and ·mortgaging between this
and other subsidized roads it is claimed that this immense grant of la11ds
has been earned, when in fact only 34 miles of road was constructed
within the time fixed by Congress, and not exceeding 100 miles has
ever been built by the company. If the grant is not forfeited it will in
a great measure inure to the benefit of roads in no sense entitled to it.
They Lave returned nothing to the Government for the lands. It will
in effect be subsidizing roads after they have been constructed With the
aid of subsidies from the Government.
The act of .April 20, 1871, entitled "An act to enable the Atlantic
and Pacific Railroad Company to mortgage its road," is sought to be
interpMed by the company to prevent a forfeiture. We cannot concur
in such a construction of this act. The evident purpose of the act was
to confer power on the company to mortgage such estate as it at the time 1
had, su~ject to the conditionR of the granting act, and not to enlarge
its rights under the grant. This act authorizing the mortgage either
does or does not give the mortgagees a lien upon the lands to which
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the road itself has no right. If it does then they are entitled to all the
''lands coterminous with or appertaining to that part of said road
which shall have been constructed at the time of the foreclosure of said
mortgage." The mortg.agees under this construction can for all time
defeat a forfeiture by refusing to foreclose. We think that Congress
intended to restrict the rights of the mortgagees to the la11ds appertaining to that part of the road completed on the 4th day of July, 1878.
If it did not so intend, much of the act is meaningless. The mortgagees
hold subject to the right and power of Congress to declare a forfeiture~
and we are unable to see any good -reason why this power should not be
exercised. If it should be judiciall.Y ascertained that the mortgagees
have vested rights under this act, then a declaration of forfeiture
will still have the effect to restore the lands to the Government, subject
to the mortgagees' claim. While we do not concede any such right, we
insist that even if such does exist, the forfeiture should nevertheless be
declared, and the company made to understand that it has no claim
upon any of the lands, and that some appropriate judicial proceedings
be at once commenced to adjust and determine the rights of the mortgagees under the mortgage.
.
We recommend the accompanying bill, which is made a part of this
paper, as a substitute for House bill 453 and the amendments reported
by a maJority of the committee.
THO. C. lVIcRAE.
JOHN A. ANDERSON.
POLK LAFFOON.
A BILL to forfeit the lands granted to the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company to aid in the construction of a railroad and telegraph line from the States of Missouri and .Arkansas to the Pacific
coast, and to restore the same to settlement, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America
in Cong1·ess assembled: SECTION 1. That all the lands, excepting the right of way,
heretofore granted to the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company by a.n act entitled
"An act granting lands to aid in the construction of a railroad and telegraph line
from the States of Missouri and Arkansas to the Pacific coast," approved July 27,
1866, and subsequent acts and joint resolutions of Congress be, and the same are
hereby, declared forfeited and restored to the public domain, and made subject to
disposal under the general homestead laws of the United States as though said
grant had never been made : Provided, This act of forfeiture shall not effect the
rights of those claiming under any mortgage made by the said company by virtue of
the act approved April 20, 1871, to so much of the htnds granted coterminuous with
or apvertaining to that part of said road which was actually constructed by the company by the 4th day of July, 1878.
SEC. 2. That all persons who at the date of the passage of this act are actual settlers in good faith on any of the lands hereby forfeited, and who are otherwise qualified, on making due claim to such lands under the homestead, pre-emption, or other
laws, within six months after the same shall have been declared forfeited, shall be
entitled to a preference right to enter the same in accordance with the provisions of
this act and of the homestead, pre-emption, or otber laws, as the case may be, and
shall he regarded as having legally settled upon and occupied said lands under said
laws from the date of such actual settlement or occupation; and in case any such settler may not be entitled to thus enter or acquire such land under existing laws, he or
she shall be permitted, within one year after the passage of this act, to purchase not
to exceed 160 acres of the same, at the price of $1.25 per acre; ancl the Secretary of the
Interior is hereby authorized and directed to make such rules and regulations as will
secure to said actual settlers the benefit of their rights under this act: Provided, That
nothing in this act shall be so construed as to afi'ect the title to any· city, town, or
village site where the same has passed to patent and been sold by the company.
SEC. 3. That the Attorney-General of the United States be, and he is hereby,
authorized and directed to institute proper legal proceedings to set aside and cancel
any mortgage or mortgages that may have been executed by said company upon
lands forfeited by this act.
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